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A TAX DEDUCTION FOR DIRECT CHARITABLE TRANS-
FERS: THE CASE AGAINST Davis v. United States, 861 F.2d 558
(9th Cir. 1988).
Abstract: Monetary transfers to charitable service providers may be deductible either as
charitable contributions or as unreimbursed expenses. Whether a charity must possess the
transfer to establish the charity control necessary to effect a charitable deduction is an
unresolved issue. Using direct transfers to Mormon missionaries in Davis v. United States
as an example, this Note concludes that direct transfers to service providers should be
deductible and proposes a test for determining when charity control is sufficient without
possession.
Congress has provided a tax deduction for charitable contributions,1
but specifically has prohibited a deduction for transfers of money
directly from one taxpayer to another to cover the transferee's living
costs.2 When the recipient of a transfer is a charitable service pro-
vider, however, the question arises whether the transfer is deductible
as a charitable contribution. This issue is illuminated by cases involv-
ing direct monetary transfers to missionaries of The Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints ("Mormon Church").
The Mormon Church operates a worldwide missionary program
with 25,000 missionaries serving at any given time.' Young men apply
to become missionaries, and, if found worthy by the Church, are
"called" to serve for a period of two years.' The Church does not pay
for a missionary's expenses. Instead, after a missionary is called, the
Church determines where the missionary is to be sent, solicits financial
support from the missionary's parents, suggests a sum it deems appro-
priate for the area in which the missionary will serve, and requests that
payments be made directly to the missionary.5
I. See I.R.C. § 170 (West 1988 & Supp. 1989).
2. Id. § 262.
3. See Davis v. United States, 861 F.2d 558, 559 (9th Cir. 1988).
4. A Mormon missionary's primary duty is to propagate the Mormon faith.
5. Davis, 861 F.2d at 560. The Mormon Church believes its direct payment scheme promotes
several worthy objectives: It encourages frugality by making the missionaries aware of their
families' sacrifice, it involves the family directly in an important Church program, and it relieves
the Church of a costly administrative burden. Id.
The Mormon Church strictly regulates a missionary's expenses and activities. Missionaries are
admonished to spend money only for missionary work, and are required to explain their expenses
in weekly reports to their Mission President. In addition, each missionary is expected to dedicate
at least 75 hours per week to Church service. Dating and attending movies or plays is prohibited.
Id at 559.
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In Davis v. United States,6 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that Section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code7 ("I.R.C.") did not
provide taxpayer parents a charitable deduction for the payments
made to their two missionary sons.8 The court held that the payments
were not deductible either as charitable contributions, because the
Mormon Church never possessed the payments, 9 or as charitable
unreimbursed expenses, because the taxpayers themselves had not per-
formed the charitable service.' °
6. Id.
7. I.R.C. § 170 (West 1988 & Supp. 1989); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(g) (1986). Section
170 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) ALLOWANCE OF DEDUCTION.-
(1) GENERAL RULE. - There shall be allowed as a deduction any charitable
contribution (as defined in subsection (c)) payment of which is made within the taxable year.
A charitable contribution shall be allowable as a deduction only if verified under regulations
prescribed by the Secretary.
(c) CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTION DEFINED - For purposes of this section, the
term "charitable contribution" means a contribution or gift to or for the use of -
(2) A corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation -
(B) organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or
educational purposes.
I.R.C. § 170 (West 1988 & Supp. 1989).
Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-l(g) provides in pertinent part:
(g) Contribution of services. No deduction is allowable under section 170 for a contribu-
tion of services. However, unreimbursed expenditures made incident to the rendition of
services to an organization contributions to which are deductible may constitute a deducti-
ble contribution. For example, the cost of a uniform without general utility which is
required to be worn in performing donated services is deductible. Similarly, out-of-pocket
transportation expenses necessarily incurred in performing donated services are deductible.
Reasonable expenditures for meals and lodging necessarily incurred while away from home
in the course of performing donated services also are deductible.
Treas. Reg § 1.170A-l(g) (1986).
8. The Davises claimed $9,133.89, the amount sent to their missionary sons, as a charitable
deduction. Davis, 861 F.2d at 560.
9. Id. at 562.
10. Id. at 565.
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The Davis court's holding directly conflicts with the holdings of the
Fifth and Tenth Circuit Courts in cases with facts virtually indistin-
guishable from Davis. I This Note examines the holdings of these Cir-
cuit Courts and argues that direct charitable transfers 2 similar to
those in Davis should be deductible either as charitable contributions
or as charitable unreimbursed expenses.
I. BACKGROUND
The legislative history of Section 170, the charitable deduction stat-
ute, the administrative and judicial interpretation of Section 170, and
the federal courts' decisions regarding Mormon missionary deductions
provide the legal framework needed to analyze Davis-type direct chari-
table transfers.
A. Legislative History and Purpose of Section 170
Congress first provided a tax deduction for charitable contributions
in the War Revenue Act of 1917.13 The original legislation was
intended to encourage charitable giving in the face of sharply
increased tax rates which were imposed during World War I.' Since
enactment, legislative declarations of the purpose of the charitable
deduction allowance have been few. 5 Congress has recognized, how-
ever, that missionary work, even when it is performed in a foreign
country, is a charitable cause to which deductible contributions can be
made. 16
11. See Brinley v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 1326, 1336 (5th Cir. 1986) (transfers to Mormon
missionary deductible either as unreimbursed expenses or charitable contributions upon proper
showing); White v. United States, 725 F.2d 1269, 1272 (10th Cir. 1984) (transfers to Mormon
missionary deductible as unreimbursed expenses).
12. For purposes of this Note, "direct charitable transfer" will mean a taxpayer's monetary
transfer made at a charity's request to a service provider or other charity-selected beneficiary
which benefits both the charity and the transferee.
13. See War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330. A charitable
deduction was proposed in 1913 but was rejected. 50 CONG. REC. 1259 (daily ed. May 6, 1913).
Commentators have both attacked and defended the charitable deduction since its enactment.
See, eg., Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309 (1972);
Bittker, Charitable Contributions: Tax Deductions or Matching Grants, 28 TAX L. REV. 37
(1972); Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Deduction, 74 VA. L. Rav. 1393 (1988); McDaniel,
Federal Matching Grants for Charitable Contributions: A Substitute for the Income Tax
Deduction, 27 TAX L. REv. 377 (1972).
14. See 2 B. BITrKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GiFrs j 35.1.1
(1981).
'15. Id.
16. "If the recipient.., is a domestic organization the fact that some portion of its funds is
used in other countries for charitable and other purposes (such as missionary and educational
purposes) will not affect the deductibility of the gift." H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess.
937
Washington Law Review
Congress has made several changes in the charitable deduction pro-
vision since 1917 to stimulate charitable giving. First, Congress has
increased repeatedly the percentage of a taxpayer's gross income
which may be deducted annually, from fifteen percent in 1917 to the
present limit of fifty percent. 17 Congress also has increased the number
of organizations that qualify as recipients of deductible charitable con-
tributions. 18 The Mormon Church is included on an Internal Revenue
Service ("IRS") list of organizations to which deductible contributions
can be made. 9
Congress also has expanded the charitable deduction provision to
allow deductions for expenses incurred by a taxpayer while performing
charitable services. Originally, only contributions of money or prop-
erty "to" a charity were deductible.2" By adding the words "or for the
use of" to the statute in 1921,21 Congress expressed its willingness to
allow deductions for a taxpayer's charitable service-related expenses
that are not reimbursed by the charity.22 The I.R.C. thus currently
recognizes two types of deductible charitable contributions: First,
direct contributions of money or property, 23 and second, service-
related unreimbursed expenses paid by a taxpayer from personal
funds. 24 These two types of deductions provide the analytic backdrop
from which the deductibility of any expenditure will be measured.
(1938), reprinted in J. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX
LAWS 1938-1861, at 17 (1939).
17. Compare War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 1201, 40 Stat. 330 (15% of gross income
deductible) with I.R.C. § 170(b) (West 1988 & Supp. 1989) (50% of gross income deductible).
For a report indicating that Congress intended these changes to encourage charitable giving, see
S. REP. No. 1584, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1953), reprinted in 1 J. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN'S
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS 1953-1939, at 1364 (1954).
18. Originally, only contributions to an organization itself engaged in charitable service were
deductible. Congress granted qualified recipient status to community chests, trusts, and
foundations, which merely funnelled donations to charities, in 1921. Revenue Act of 1921, ch.
136, § 214(a)(ii), 42 Stat. 227.
19. Internal Revenue Service Pub. No. 78, Cumulative List of Organizations 268 (1988).
20. War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 330.
21. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 214(a)(ii), 42 Stat. 227.
22. In 1939, the Treasury Department issued regulations to govern the deductibility of
unreimbursed expenses. See Treas. Reg. § 39.23(a)-l (1939). Even before this change, however,
courts had allowed such deductions. See, e.g., Wolfe v. McCaughn, 5 F. Supp. 407, 410 (E.D,
Pa. 1933) (taxpayer's unreimbursed expenses for services for YMCA in Europe during World
War I held deductible as contributions "to" charity).
23. I.R.C. § 170 (West 1988 & Supp. 1989).
24. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(g) (1986).
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B. Administrative and Judicial Interpretation of Section 170
Both the IRS and the judiciary have interpreted Section 170. Often
utilizing IRS interpretations of the statute, courts have developed sep-
arate and distinct tests to determine the deductibility of taxpayer
expenditures, either as charitable contributions or unreimbursed
expenses.
L The Deductibility of Charitable Contributions
Charitable contributions must satisfy two conditions to be deducti-
ble under Section 170: First, the transfer must be a "contribution or
gift,"2 and, second, it must be "to or for the use of" a qualified
recipient.26
A transfer constitutes a "contribution or gift" when the donor
receives no economic benefit, no quidpro quo, from the charity as con-
sideration for making a donation.27 When the economic value of the
quid pro quo received is less than the total value of a transfer, the
deductible gift portion of the transfer is reduced by the value of the
quid pro quo received.28 A transfer's characterization as a gift is pre-
cluded entirely, however, by the donor's receipt or expectation of an
economic benefit commensurate with the amount of money or prop-
erty transferred.29
25. I.R.C. § 170(c) (West 1988 & Supp. 1989). The terms "contribution" and "gift" are
synonymous. See, eg., Allen v. United States, 541 F.2d 786, 787 (9th Cir. 1976).
26. I.R.C. § 170(c) (West 1988 & Supp. 1989).
27. See Rev. Rul. 76-185, 1976-1 C.B. 60; Rev. Rul. 76-232, 1976-1 C.B. 62. Some courts,
however, also appear to require that the transfer proceed from "detached and disinterested
generosity," a test first announced by the Supreme Court for Section 102 purposes in Duberstein
v. Commissioner, 363 U.S. 278 (1960). The Ninth Circuit was first to adopt the Duberstein test
for Section 170 purposes in Dejong v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 373, 379 (9th Cir. 1962).
Commentators have vigorously criticized application of the Duberstein test to charitable
contributions. See, eg., Colliton, The Meaning of "Contribution or Gift" For Charitable
Deduction Purposes, 41 OrHo ST. L.J. 973, 999-1002 (1980); Comment, Disinterested Generosity:
An Emerging Criteria of Deductibility Under § 170, 1968 UTAH L. REv. 475. In addition, the
First and Seventh Circuits, and a Court of Claims have declined to use the Duberstein test. See
Sedam v. United States, 518 F.2d 242, 245 (7th Cir. 1975); Oppewal v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d
1000 (1st Cir. 1972); Singer v. United States, 449 F.2d 413 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
28. See Rev. Rul. 76-185, 1976-1 C.B. 60; Rev. Rul. 76-232, 1976-1 C.B. 62. By way of
example, in two prior cases, the deductible portion of contributions to schools attended by the
taxpayer's children have been reduced by the amount the IRS deemed to be tuition payments.
See Oppewal, 468 F.2d at 1002; DeJong, 309 F.2d at 379.
29. Both Congress and the IRS have so indicated. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. A44 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 196 (1954); Rev. Rul. 76-185, 1976-1
C.B. 60; Rev. Rul. 76-232, 1976-1 C.B. 62. When the value of the quid pro quo received cannot
be determined accurately but is nevertheless "substantial" so as to appear commensurate with
the value of the transfer, the transfer is not a gift. See, e.g., Singer, 449 F.2d at 423; Stubbs v.
United States, 428 F.2d 885, 887 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1009 (1971).
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The second requirement for deductibility is that the gift must be
contributed "to or for the use of" a qualified recipient.3" A taxpayer
satisfies this requirement by showing that the charity has exercised
control over the donated funds.3" Charity control preserves the
indefiniteness of a beneficiary32 and, therefore, prevents the deduction
of earmarked contributions.33 Transfers to private individuals, regard-
less of their charitable nature, are not deductible.34 Likewise, when a
taxpayer restricts a transfer's use by earmarking it specifically for the
benefit of a particular individual, the transfer is private and, lacking
indefiniteness, cannot be deducted. When, however, a charity
retains control by itself selecting the beneficiary of a donation, tax-
payer transfers to the beneficiary are deductible.36 Under these cir-
cumstances, the fact that the donor knows the identity of an individual
or cause which is to benefit does not preclude a deduction.37
Charity control that guarantees a charity discretion as to the use of
the donated funds is sufficient to effect a deduction.38 The IRS's test
in each case is whether the organization had "full control" which
ensured that the donation was used to carry out the charity's functions
30. Qualified recipients are defined in I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(A)-(D) (West 1988 & Supp. 1989).
31. See Rev. Rul. 62-113, 1962-2 C.B. 10, 11 (the test in each case is whether the organization
had full control of the contribution and, thus, discretion as to its use).
32. Indefiniteness in beneficiary exists when a charity rather than a donor identifies who is to
benefit from the transfer. See, e.g., Thomason v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 441, 443 (1943) (charity
begins where certainty in beneficiary ends).
33. A donor may not restrict a donation for the benefit of a specific individual. See, e.g.,
Russell v. Allen, 107 U.S. 163, 167 (1882) (indefiniteness in beneficiary is an essential
characteristic of a charitable donation); Tripp v. Commissioner, 337 F.2d 432, 436 (7th Cir.
1964) (scholarship designated by donor for specific individual not deductible).
34. Dohrmann v. Commissioner, 18 B.T.A. 66, 68-69 (1929) (no deduction for donation to
needy individuals).
35. See, e.g., Thomason, 2 T.C. at 443 (transfer earmarked for charity's charge not
deductible). See generally Blasi & Denesha, Avoiding Disallowance of Earmarked Charitable
Contributions, 9 REV. OF TAX'N OF INDIVIDUALS 160, 163-64 (1985) (discussion of permissible
extent of earmarking charitable contributions).
36. See, e.g., Brinley v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 1326, 1335 (5th Cir. 1986) (transfers to
Mormon missionary deductible where Church selects beneficiary); Winn v. Commissioner, 595
F.2d 1060, 1065 (5th Cir. 1979) (transfers to a specific missionary held deductible when Church
selected the beneficiary and funds dealt with as Church wished); Bauer v. United States, 449 F.
Supp. 755, 759 (W.D. La. 1978) (direct payment to scholarship recipient selected by school
deductible), aff'd, 594 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1979).
37. Indefiniteness in beneficiary becomes an irrelevant consideration once a charity has made
the beneficiary definite. See Brinley, 782 F.2d at 1332; Winn, 595 F.2d at 1065.
38. Rev. Rul. 62-113, 1962-2 C.B. 10, 11.
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and purposes.3 9 Although charity possession of donated funds some-
times has been viewed as a required element of full control, 4° courts
have found sufficient control when possession was lacking.4"
2. The Deductibility of Charitable Unreimbursed Expenses
In addition to charitable contributions, a taxpayer may deduct char-
itable unreimbursed expenses.42 A two-step test is used to determine
whether a claimed unreimbursed expense may be deducted.43 First,
the connection between the expenditure and service is examined to
determine whether the expenses truly were incurred incident to chari-
table service. The IRS has indicated that an expenditure is incurred
incident to charitable service when it is directly connected with and
solely attributable to the rendition of charitable services.' Under this
test, deductions have been allowed for the purchase price of religious
material used in missionary work,45 expenses for the operation and
maintenance of a privately owned aircraft,46 legal fees,4 7 and even for
the purchase price of illegal drugs and information in connection with
a drug enforcement program.48
Second, unreimbursed expenses must be incurred "for the use of" a
charity to be deductible. Many service related expenses have a dual
character49 in that they benefit both the charity and the service pro-
vider. A "primary benefit" test is used to distinguish between situa-
tions where benefits accrue primarily to the service provider, and those
where benefits accrue primarily to the charity and only incidentally to
the service provider. While in the latter situation an expenditure will
be "for the use of" the charity, the presence of a substantial direct
39. Id.
40. See, eg., Davis v. United States, 861 F.2d 558, 562 (9th Cir. 1988).
41. See Brinley, 782 F.2d at 1335; Archbold v. United States, 444 F.2d 1120, 1123 (Ct. Cl.
1971); Bauer v. United States, 449 F. Supp. 755, 758 (W.D. La. 1978), aff'd, 594 F.2d 44 (5th
Cir. 1979).
42. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(g) (1986) indicates that the value of services is not deductible but
lists several examples of deductible expenses. See supra note 7. In addition, only actual
payments are deductible; thus, deductions are not allowed for depreciation, Orr v. United States,
343 F.2d 553, 557 (5th Cir. 1965), or for fair rental value, McCollum v. Commissioner, 37
T.C.M. (CCH) 1817, 1820 (1978).
43. See Note, Brinley v. Commissioner: A Modified Charitable Deduction Standard for
Missionary Support Payments, 40 Sw. L.J. 1267, 1272 (1987).
44. See, eg., Rev. Rul. 76-89, 1976-1 C.B. 58; Rev. Rul. 69-473, 1969-1 C.B. 37.
45. See, eg., Rev. Rul. 76-89, 1976-1 C.B. 58.
* 46. See Rev. Rul. 58-279, 1958-1 C.B. 145.
47. Archbold v. United States, 444 F.2d 1120, 1124 (Ct. CL. 1971).
48. Sampson v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 1408, 1414 (1982).
49. Seed v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 265, 276 (1971).
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personal benefit inuring to and anticipated by the service provider pre-
cludes a deduction.5°
Whether a taxpayer who donates money to cover the unreimbursed
expenses incurred by a service provider is entitled to a deduction is
unclear. Neither Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-1(g) nor legislative
declarations concerning Section 170 specifically prohibit deductions by
such third party taxpayers. 5' The IRS has argued, however, that
allowing third parties a deduction invites two types of taxpayer
abuse:52 First, deduction shifting where high bracket donors assign
income to lower bracket service providers in excess of the amount the
charity itself would provide, and, second, double deductions where
deductions for the same funds are taken by both the third party and
the service provider. Nevertheless, a majority of courts that have
examined deductions by third parties have held them deductible, rea-
soning that expenditures that primarily serve the charity satisfy the
statutory requirements.53
C. Mormon Missionary Cases: The Tenth and Fifth Circuits
Both the Tenth and Fifth Circuits have allowed the deduction of
Mormon missionary support payments. In White v. United States,54
the Tenth Circuit allowed the third party parents an unreimbursed
expense deduction, seeing no rational basis for distinguishing the
expenses of a dependent son from the payment of a taxpayer's own
expenses to perform the same services.5 5 Because the missionary's
expenses were incurred incident to charitable service and primarily
50. Id. at 275-76; see also Babilonia v. Commissioner, 681 F.2d 678, 679 (9th Cir. 1982)
(parents' expenses incurred while traveling overseas for daughter's skating competition not
deductible).
51. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(g) (1986), quoted in part supra note 7. The legislative history
of the 1986 Tax Reform Act implies that the deduction is properly taken by a service provider.
See H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 119 (1985) ("A taxpayer may deduct . . .
unreimbursed out-of-pocket expenses incurred incident to the rendition of services provided by
the taxpayer to a charitable organization.").
52. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 861 F.2d 558, 563 (9th Cir. 1988).
53. See, e.g., Rockefeller v. Commissioner, 676 F.2d 35, 42 (2d Cir. 1982) (salaries, travel,
entertainment, and other expenses incurred by charitable service providers deductible to third
person donor); Archbold v. United States, 444 F.2d 1120, 1123 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (legal fees paid for
attorney services to protect a gift of property to a city deductible to third person donor);
McCollum v. Commissioner 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1817, 1820 (1978) (parents' payments of expenses
incurred by children who rendered services to National Ski Patrol deductible). The Ninth
Circuit alone denys third parties an unreimbursed expense deduction.
54. 725 F.2d 1269 (10th Cir. 1984).
55. Id. at 1271.
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served the Mormon Church, the court had "no difficulty" in conclud-
ing they were deductible.5 6
In Brinley v. Commissioner,7 the Fifth Circuit held that the pay-
ments would be deductible either as unreimbursed expenses or direct
contributions upon the proper showing." In its unreimbursed expense
analysis, the court concluded that the expenses were incurred incident
to charitable services.5 9 While finding the primary benefit test applica-
ble, the court remanded the case to the Tax Court because it could not
determine on the evidence before it which expenditures primarily
served the Church. On remand, the Tax Court allowed the deduction
of all of the claimed expenses.A The Brinley court next considered
whether the amounts were deductible as direct charitable contribu-
tions. The court rejected a formal requirement of charity possession of
donated funds.6 The court determined that when the charity itself
selects a charitable cause and solicits funds for that cause, charity con-
trol and discretion may be maintained without possession.62 The
court concluded that a donor's payment in response to the charity's
specific solicitation would be deductible upon the taxpayer's showing
of a matching of solicitation and expenditure.63
II. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S APPROACH: DAVIS V UNITED
S TA TES
The Ninth Circuit in Davis v. United States, 64 held that the taxpay-
ers' transfers were not deductible either as direct contributions or as
56. Id. at 1272. Courts have reached disparate conclusions regarding the deductibility of
Mormon missionaries' lodging and meal expenses as unreimbursed expenses. Treasury
Regulation § 1.170A-I(g) (1986) indicates that lodging and meal expenses are deductible only if
the service provider is "away from home." See supra note 7. The Tenth Circuit in White found
that the missionary was "away from home" and allowed the deduction of lodging and meal
expenses. White, 725 F.2d at 1272. The Fifth Circuit in Brinley held, however, that the
missionary was not "away from home" and, therefore, denied a deduction for lodging and meal
costs. Brinley v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 1326, 1334 (5th Cir. 1986). The Davis court did not
reach the "away from home" issue. See Davis v. United States, 861 F.2d 558, 564 n.l (9th Cir.
1988). This topic is beyond the scope of this Note.
57. 782 F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 1986).
58. Id. at 1333, 1336.
59. Id. at 1331-32. The court concluded that indefiniteness is irrelevant when services are
contributed since both the donor and beneficiary charity already are ascertained. Id. at 1332.
60. The parties stipulated to this outcome. The amount deducted included lodging and meal
expenses. See Brinley v. United States, Tax Court Doc. No. 28349-81 (October 30, 1986).
61. Brinley, 782 F.2d at 1330, 1334-35.
62. Id. at 1334.
63. Id. at 1335-36. The court could not determine on the record whether sufficient control
existed. Id.
64. 861 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1988).
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unreimbursed expenses. The transfers were not deductible as direct
contributions because, first, the parents' receipt of a quidpro quo-the
assurance that their missionary son would be clothed, housed, and
fed-brought into question the transfer's gift status." Second, the
court held that the transfers were not "to or for the use of" the Mor-
mon Church because the missionaries' direct receipt of the funds pre-
cluded the Church's possessory control.66 The court held that
possession is a required element of control which preserves the indefi-
niteness of beneficiary and prevents earmarked transfers.67
The Davis court also disallowed deduction of the transfers as chari-
table unreimbursed expenses. The court did not read Treasury Regu-
lation § 1.170A- 1(g) as allowing a deduction by anyone other than the
service provider; it feared that allowing third parties a deduction
would promote taxpayer abuse and impose an administrative burden
upon the IRS.68 The court declined to follow White69 and Brinley,7°
and distinguished cases where third parties had deducted
unreimbursed expenses, contending that those deductions actually
"were for unreimbursed expenses incurred by the taxpayers in render-
ing services to charities." 7
1
III. ANALYSIS
A. Section 170 Charitable Contribution Analysis
Direct charitable transfers should be deductible as Section 170 char-
itable contributions. First, these transfers constitute a "contribution
or gift" because neither the donor nor the service provider receives an
impermissible quid pro quo. Second, the presence or absence of char-
ity possession does not guarantee or preclude charity control. Third,
these transfers are "to or for the use of" the charity because, under the
"charity control" test proposed below, charity control can be demon-
strated even when possession is lacking.72
65. Id. at 562.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 564.
69. Id. at 562.
70. Id. at 563-64.
71. Id. at 564-65. The court's contention is incorrect. Although in the cases cited by the
court the third parties rendered charitable service, they in fact received deductions for expenses
incurred by other individuals. See Rockefeller v. Commissioner, 676 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1982);
McCollum v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1817, 1820-21 (1978).
72. The Davis court noted that public policy demands that charitable deduction statutes must
be given a broad construction, citing Helvering v. Bliss, 293 U.S. 144, 150-51 (1934), and that
944
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L The "Contribution or Gift" Requirement
The first requirement for the deduction of charitable contributions
was satisfied in Davis because neither the taxpayer nor service provider
received an impermissible quidpro quo. A donation is a gift and there-
fore deductible when no economic quidpro quo is received by a donor;
a deduction is disallowed, however, to the extent that a donor econom-
ically benefits because of a transfer to charity.73 In Davis, the court
accepted the government's argument that the quid pro quo received by
the parent taxpayers was an assurance that their sons would receive
proper care.74 Receipt of an assurance is not an economic event
which, standing alone, precludes a transfer's gift status. The taxpay-
ers' sons, however, did economically benefit because the payments
were used for their care. The parents in Davis argued that the funds
should be deductible because payment of the missionary sons' living
costs conferred a benefit on the church.75 The IRS responded that the
transfers were neither to nor for the use of the Church.76 When one
who benefits from a *contribution is a charitable service provider,
whether a transfer is a deductible charitable gift or a non-deductible
personal gift turns on whether the charity or the service provider pri-
marily benefitted from the transfer.
A transfer is a gift wheft a charity is primarily benefitted. The Ninth
Circuit in Davis, however, relied on its previous decision in DeJong v.
Commissioner77 for the proposition that transfers to a charity are non-
deductible when the taxpayer's child is benefitted by the transfer.78 In
DeJong, the taxpayer parents contributed money to their children's
school. As students, the children rendered no charitable service, but
instead received educational services from the charity. The school's
benefit from the parents' donation was reduced by the expense it
incurred to educate the children. The court held that the parents' pay-
ment was partly for a personal expense and denied a deduction for that
portion of the payment which represented tuition.79 The situation is
different, however, when, as in Davis, the donations are to a charitable
service provider. In this situation, the charity is benefitted by the
tax provisions generally should be construed whenever possible in favor of taxpayers, citing
Burnet v. Niagara Falls Brewing Co., 282 U.S. 648, 654 (1931). Davis, 861 F.2d at 565.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
74. Davis, 861 F.2d at 562.
75. Id
76. Id.
77. 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962).
78. Davis, 861 F.2d at 562.
79. DeJong, 309 F.2d at 379.
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charitable work of the service provider. In the Mormon missionary
context, but for the parents' payment of essential living expenses, no
charitable service could be rendered.8" Because direct charitable
transfers facilitate the provision of charitable services, the charity pri-
marily benefits while the service provider benefits only incidentally.8"
Because neither the taxpayer nor the service provider are impermissi-
bly benefitted, a direct charitable transfer is a "contribution or gift."
2. The Control Requirement
A charity must exercise control over a taxpayer's transfer to qualify
the transfer for a deduction.82 Charity control prevents donor
earmarking and guarantees that the beneficiary of a donation will be
indefinite. The abuse feared in cases like Davis is that taxpayers will
earmark funds for particular service providers and, by characterizing
the transfers as charitable contributions, obtain deductions for trans-
fers which are in fact personal gifts.83 Transfers earmarked for donor-
selected beneficiaries are correctly held non-deductible because there is
no assurance that the charity, in its discretion, would apply a transfer
to the same cause or select the same beneficiary as did the donor.84
When a charity controls a contribution and itself selects the benefici-
ary of the transfer, charity discretion is maintained and the deduction
of earmarked personal gifts is prevented. The requirement of indefi-
niteness also is satisfied because the charity, rather than the donor,
makes the beneficiary definite. Therefore, a deduction is warranted
only when the charity exercises control sufficient to guarantee it dis-
cretionary use of donated funds.85
Cases cited by the Ninth Circuit in Davis do not support its holding
that possession is an essential element of charity control which pre-
serves indefiniteness and prevents earmarking. For example, in Winn
80. The Church pays the expenses if the missionary's parents do not pay. Davis, 861 F.2d at
559.
81. A mere showing of incidental benefit to a service provider does not preclude a deduction.
See, e.g., Brinley v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 1326, 1334 (5th Cir. 1986) (even when service
provider primarily benefits, a deduction is allowed provided charity controls the donation);
Bauer v. United States, 449 F. Supp. 755, 759 (W.D. La. 1978) (no reason or authority shows
that benefit by the individual should defeat deductibility of a gift), aff'd, 594 F.2d 44 (5th Cir.
1979).
82. See Rev. Rul. 62-113, 1962-2 C.B. 10, 11.
83. See, e.g., Davis, 861 F.2d at 562-66. I.R.C. § 262 (West 1988 & Supp. 1989) proscribes
the deduction of personal, family, or living expenses; thus, the deduction of personal gifts also is
precluded.
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v. Commissioner,86 a church established "Sara Barry Days" to collect
funds for the support of Sara's missionary work. A church officer,
Sara's father, obtained possession of the funds and forwarded them
directly to her. The contribution was held deductible.17 In Brinley,
the Fifth Circuit which had decided Winn cautioned, however, that
Winn "should not be construed to require physical control over
donated funds." 8 The court indicated that possession was'not critical
to its finding of sufficient charity control.89 Instead, the fact that the
church established the charitable cause and selected the donation's
beneficiary led to the conclusion of deductibility. 90
Likewise, in Peace v. Commissioner,9' a taxpayer sent several checks
to a mission in Sudan, insisting each time that they be used only by
specific missionaries. 92 Under the mission's policy all transfers
restricted by a donor to a specific individual were applied as desig-
nated. 93 This policy guaranteed the donor, not the charity, discretion
with respect to selection of a beneficiary. Although the mission
received possession of the funds, the donor's restrictions were honored
for each transfer.94 Surprisingly, the Peace court allowed a deduction
notwithstanding the strong indications of impermissible donor
earmarking.95 Under the Peace court's rationale, a donor could
deduct an earmarked contribution so long as the charity agrees to the
donor's earmarking, a result which comports neither with IRS revenue
rulings96 nor prior case law.97
86. 595 F.2d 1060 (5th Cir. 1979).
87. Id. at 1065.
88. Brinley v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 1326, 1335 (9th Cir. 1986). The court noted that the
officer's control in Winn contributed to the degree of control required. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1334-36.
91. 43 T.C. 1 (1964).
92. Id. at 2-5. The missionaries' names were written on the face of the checks which were
made payable to the mission. Other correspondence reiterated the restrictions. Id.
93. It at 5.
94. The Davis court viewed the control in Peace as sufficient because the funds were
"distributed only as the mission determined, despite specific directives by the donors." Davis v.
United States, 861 F.2d 558, 562 (9th Cir. 1988). At no time, however, were the funds in Peace
distributed to non-designated missionaries despite the donor's directives. See Peace, 43 T.C. at
2-6.
95. The Peace court believed the donor's restrictions were merely manifestations of desire,
and found control because the funds were possessed and distributed under the mission's policy.
Peace, 43 T.C. at 7, 8.
96. Funds distinctly marked by a donor for a specific person or received by a charity pursuant
to a commitment or understanding that they would be so used are not deductible. See, eg., Rev.
Rul. 62-113, 1962-2 C.B. 10, 11.
97. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
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Other cases demonstrate that charity possession is not a threshold
issue whose presence or absence necessarily creates or destroys charity
control. For example, in Tripp v. Commissioner,98 a taxpayer made
payment to a scholarship fund, restricting the payments for the benefit
of a particular student. The school received possession of the funds
and dealt with them as the donor requested. The court denied a
deduction despite the school's possessory control because the pay-
ments were not to be used as the college saw fit, but were to be applied
to the educational expenses of a designated student.99
In contrast, the lack of charity possession does not necessarily pre-
clude charity control. For example, in Bauer v. United States, 100 the
taxpayer supported a scholarship fund for several schools. The
schools, not the donor, selected the recipients and requested the donor
to forward payment to the students directly. The schools themselves
never possessed the donated funds. Holding the contribution deducti-
ble, the court found the direct payment a perfectly "practical proce-
dure for handling ... contributions,"'' t 1 and noted that the fact that
the donation was made payable to the student was not inconsistent
with an intent to further educational purposes."0O These cases demon-
strate that possession of donated funds does not guarantee charity dis-
cretion nor does its absence preclude discretion.
3. Control Without Possession: The Charity Control Test
Although the Ninth Circuit in Davis adopted a possessory control
test, 10 3 the Fifth Circuit in Brinley enunciated a viable non-possessory
control test' °4 that better implements Congress' policy of encouraging
contributions to charity. Courts could use the following "charity con-
trol" test to determine when control by the charity is sufficient in the
absence of possession. Adapted from Brinley, the proposed charity
control test has three requirements: First, a charity must unilaterally
98. 337 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1964).
99. Id. at 436; see also Thomason v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 441, 443 (1943) (donor payments
for a charity's charge to attend a special school not deductible despite charity possession because
payments were for privileges the charity in its discretion would not have furnished); Cook v.
Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 771, 774 (1978) (deduction denied despite possession by
church ministers because fund's use not determined by church); Mayo v. Commissioner, 30
T.C.M. (CCH) 505, 507 (1971) (payments to missionaries in excess of amounts allocated by
church not deductible).
100. 449 F. Supp. 755 (W.D. La. 1978), aff'd, 594 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1979).
101. Bauer, 449 F. Supp. at 759.
102. Id.
103. Davis v. United States, 861 F.2d 558, 562 (9th Cir. 1988).
104. Brinley v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 1326, 1334-35 (5th Cir. 1986).
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establish a charitable cause."15 Second, the charity itself must desig-
nate who is to benefit from transfers to that cause. Third, the charity
must solicit financial support for that cause, in writing, from the tax-
payer. 10 6 Thereafter, taxpayer transfers will be deductible upon dem-
onstration of a matching between charity solicitation and taxpayer
response.
Meeting the charity control test assures that charity discretion is
preserved and deductions for earmarked transfers and personal gifts
are prevented. The charity has control and discretion because the
charity, not the donor, establishes the charitable cause and itself
designates who is to benefit from the taxpayer's transfers. Once the
charity has ascertained the beneficiary, indefiniteness becomes irrele-
vant.1 07 Further, because only the charity may select a beneficiary,
donor earmarking is prevented. 08 The deduction of personal gifts
also is prevented because the donor must prove that a charitable
organization specifically requested a donation and that response was
made only to the extent requested. 0 9
The charity control test has the further advantage of allowing a
charity to select a donation scheme which best serves its goals." 0
Many charitable organizations establish specific charitable causes for
which they solicit funds. A variety of methods are employed to direct
donated funds to charitable causes. So long as charity discretion is
preserved, one method need not be favored over another. Requiring a
taxpayer to sanitize funds by passing them through the charity's hands
raises the form of the donation over its substance.' Moreover, where
105. Missionary work or a scholarship program are examples of what may constitute a
charitable cause.
106. The Brinley court did not require a written solicitation. A writing requirement, however,
would assure that the solicitation was in fact charity initiated and could be required by the IRS
for proof of the taxpayer's right to a deduction. Amounts contributed in excess of the solicitation,
if used to support service providers, would be considered non-deductible personal gifts.
107. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
108. Under the charity control test, charities would be unlikely to allow donor earmarking
because the test's written solicitation requirement would implicate the charity in an
impermissible donation scheme, and, thus, subject it to possible IRS action with respect to its
qualified recipient status.
109. When a transfer is to a charitable service provider, the reasonableness of the charity's
request could be judged by comparing the amount requested with the per diem amount allowed
by the Federal government to its employees for the same area in which the service provider
renders service. Also, the IRS views reimbursed expenditures of up to $44 per day for actual
expenses as reasonable and not includible in gross income. See Rev. Rul. 80-62, 1980-1 C.B. 63,
64.
110. The Mormon Church, for example, believes its direct payment scheme furthers several
worthy goals. See supra note 5.
111. The Ninth Circuit appears to advocate the rise of form over substance by its adoption of
Peace. Under the Peace rationale, a donor may earmark funds and still obtain a deduction
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donors are requested to make direct contributions to charitable causes,
the unpredictability of a deduction may discourage contributions or
decrease the amount donated. For these reasons, an absolute require-
ment of possessory control does not promote, but frustrates the Con-
gressional purpose of encouraging contributions behind Section 170.
Under the charity control test, the direct charitable transfers to the
Mormon missionaries in Davis would be deductible. Although it never
physically possessed the donated funds, the Mormon Church itself
established the charitable cause of missionary work and selected the
taxpayers' sons as missionaries. It then solicited support from the mis-
sionaries' parents in writing. The Church had control over support
payments and discretion as to their use because the Church, not the
donor parents, designated how the solicited funds were to be used.' 2
The Church's control was enhanced by its exercise of pervasive con-
trol over the missionaries' activities and expenditures. 1 3 Further,
because the Church proscribes non-missionary activities and requests
payments only in an amount necessary to cover basic living essen-
tials, " 4 the likelihood that the funds would be used for non-charitable
purposes was minimized.
Indefiniteness in beneficiary also was preserved because the Church,
not the parents, made the beneficiary definite.11 5 Moreover, the ulti-
mate beneficiary of support payments was not the missionaries but the
persons who received the missionaries' services. The payments facili-
tated the missionaries' rendition of services to an indefinite number of
individuals whose identity was unknown to the donors. Thus, the
indefiniteness in ultimate beneficiary was preserved. Therefore, under
the charity control test, the transfers in Davis would be deductible." 6
simply by funnelling the donation through a complacent charity, thus altering the form of
donation rather than its substance.
112. The Davis court implied that the church must exercise discretion over each missionary
expenditure. See Davis v. United States, 861 F.2d 558, 562 (9th Cir. 1988). Such a scheme is
impractical, not necessary to stem abuse, and not mandated by previous case law.
113. See supra note 5.
114. Brief for Appellant at 6, Davis v. United States, 861 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1988) (No. 87-
4170).
115. The requirement of indefiniteness is satisfied once the charity ascertains the beneficiary.
See supra note 37.
116. Application of the charity control test need not be limited to service provider support
situations. Scholarship donations, or donations to medical researchers made at the request of a
sponsoring hospital are examples of situations where the test could have equal applicability.
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B. Unreimbursed Expense Analysis
As an alternative to a charitable contribution deduction, direct
charitable transfers to service providers also should be deductible as
unreimbursed expenses. Judicial decisions support the conclusion that
third party donors should be allowed a deduction. In analyzing third
party deductions, however, courts should use the "charity control"
test rather than the "primary benefit" test because it provides greater
safeguards against taxpayer abuse.
Neither Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-l(g) 1 7 nor the legislative
history of Section 170118 explicitly prohibit a third party deduction for
unreimbursed expenses. The Davis court held, however, that only ser-
vice providers may deduct unreimbursed expenses, relying heavily on
the legislative history of the 1986 Tax Reform Act as support for this
conclusion.' 1 9 The legislative history cited, however, is at best vague
as to who is to take a deduction. 20 With no clear statutory or legisla-
tive guidance, it is left to the judiciary to resolve whether a third party
donor should be allowed an unreimbursed expense deduction.
The vast majority of courts that have examined the deduction of
unreimbursed expenses by third parties have held them deductible. 2 '
This result is appropriate because allowing third party deductions
encourages joint charitable giving, where one individual contributes
time and another money. Individuals who, for whatever reason, value
their time more than the expenditure of personal funds may be
matched with individuals who have sufficient time to donate to chari-
table service but lack the funds to do so. When these two types of
individuals join together the cause of charitable service is promoted,
fulfilling the purpose of the charitable deduction allowance.
Abuse of a third party deduction, however, is a relevant concern. 122
While Congress has consistently sought to stimulate charitable giving,
it has revised Section 170 when it perceived the statute was being
abused. 123 The Davis court's fear of abusive double deductions and
117. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(g) (1986).
118. See supra note 51.
119. Davis v. United States, 861 F.2d 558, 564 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing H.R. REP. No. 426,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 119 (1985)).
120. See H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 119 (1985); supra note 51.
121. See supra note 53.
122. For types of abuse feared by the IRS see supra note 52 and accompanying text.
123. For example, in response to abuse Congress in 1969 repealed the unlimited deduction for
charitable contributions and greatly restricted deductions for gifts of property to charity. See




deduction shifting was a primary motivation behind its denial of a
deduction. 124
Use of the primary benefit test is justified when a service provider
seeks a deduction because the possibility of abusive double deductions
or deduction shifting is not present. Moreover, in this situation the
expenses claimed are entitled to a presumption of reasonableness.
This presumption is warranted because Treasury Regulation
§ 1.170A- 1(g) does not allow a deduction for the value of services.125
A service provider thus gives personal service for the charitable cause
without compensation. This personal sacrifice provides a built-in
check on the reasonableness of a service provider's expenses and the
deduction sought; it seems unlikely that such a person would
manipulate the occasion by incurring unreasonable expenses merely to
gain a tax benefit.
The same presumption of reasonableness does not attach when a
deduction is sought by a third party. The opportunity for abuse that
arises because the charitable organization does not control the expen-
diture or require the third party to donate increases as the connection
between the unreimbursed expense and the charitable service becomes
more removed. In these circumstances, the actual intent of the third
party donor becomes suspect. Particularly where the transfer benefits
the taxpayer's relative, the suspicion arises that the transfer is a per-
sonal gift. Likewise, the question of who should determine whether an
expenditure will further the aims of the charitable organization, the
third party donor or the charity, begs for an inquiry into whether the
expenditure was for a donor-restricted or charity-selected cause. To
be consistent with the statute, case law, and the intent of Congress
only expenditures for charity-selected causes should be deductible.
Accordingly, in the third party deduction context, charity control
should be required.126 Control in this situation should be determined
under the charity control test 127 rather than a possessory control test.
Indeed, unreimbursed expenses are made "for the use of" a charity
124. Davis v. United States, 861 F.2d 558, 563 (9th Cir. 1988).
125. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(g) (1986), quoted in part supra note 7.
126. The Brinley court concluded that rigorous application of the primary benefit test would
preclude serious possibility of abuse. Brinley v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 1326, 1332 (5th Cir.
1986). The government, however, has consistently argued for application of a control test. See,
e.g., Davis, 861 F.2d at 563; Brinley, 782 F.2d at 1330; White v. United States, 725 F.2d 1269,
1271 (10th Cir. 1984). Commentators also have argued for a control test. See Note, Does
Charity Begin at Home? The Tax Status of a Payment to an Individual as a Charitable
Deduction, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1428 (1985); Burke & Friel, Charity Begins at Home: Brinley v.
Comm'r, 10 REV. OF TAX'N OF INDIVIDUALS 379 (1986).
127. See supra note 103-05 and accompanying text.
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out of the taxpayer's own funds.12 8 Requiring a charity to physically
possess donated funds would effectively read "for the use of" out of
Section 170, and preclude characterization of the transfers as
unreimbursed expenses. Application of the charity control test, how-
ever, would not require the statute to be rewritten, and would permit
funds to be contributed for the use of a charity.
The requirement of control in third party deduction cases would
prevent double deductions and deduction shifting. Under the charity
control test, the third party taxpayer would bear the burden of show-
ing a specific request from a charity for a specific amount of money to
be eligible for a deduction. The possibility of double deductions would
decline because only the taxpayer incurring the expense, the third
party donor, would be able to produce the required proof. Likewise,
the likelihood of deduction shifting would be reduced because the
charity itself requested the taxpayer to incur the financial liability of a
donation. Donations in excess of what the charity itself would provide
would be foreclosed because the amount in excess of the charity
request would be considered a non-deductible personal gift. More-
over, charities are unlikely to request more than is necessary for a
given cause because the IRS has the power to remove the charity from
the list of charities to which deductible funds may be contributed.1 29
Under this proposed analysis, transfers to the Mormon missionaries
in Davis would be deductible. Control existed because the church
requested the expenditure and designated the cause. Double deduc-
tions could not occur because the missionaries had no wage income.13 0
Deduction shifting was not possible because the taxpayer parents were
specifically requested to donate. Similarly, because only the amount
the church requested is deductible, the possibility of deductions in
excess of the church's request, an abuse feared by the Davis court, did
not exist.13 ' Therefore, the transfers would be deductible as
unreimbursed expenses.
128. Some courts have construed unreimbursed expenses as contributions "to" a charity. See
Rockefeller v. Commissioner, 676 F.2d 35, 41 (2d Cir. 1982); Wolfe v. McCaughn, 5 F. Supp.
407, 410 (E.D. Pa. 1933).
129. The IRS also has the option of reducing a deduction to an amount it considers
reasonable.
130. Because missionaries are paid no wages, most file no income tax return. If a missionary
had significant non-wage income, the IRS could require the taxpayers to include the charity's
written request for funds with their tax returns. A comparison of the written request with the
missionary's return would preclude double deductions.
131. The Mormon Church's request is prima facie reasonable because the amount requested
by the church rarely exceeds one-half of the Federal per diem allowance. Telephone interview





Direct charitable transfers should be deductible as Section 170 char-
itable contributions. The possessory control test adopted by the Ninth
Circuit in Davis v. United States fails to guarantee the required element
of charity discretion, and frustrates charitable giving by unnecessarily
impeding the deduction of charitable transfers. The better reasoned
approach lies in applying the proposed charity control test which both
assures that charity discretion is preserved and prevents taxpayer
abuse of Section 170. If it had applied the charity control test, the
Davis court could have furthered the underlying purpose of Section
170 by encouraging contributions to charity.
Alternatively, direct charitable transfers should be deductible as
unreimbursed expenses. In Davis, the Ninth Circuit held that only
service providers are entitled to an unreimbursed expense deduction.
Allowing the third party taxpayers in Davis a deduction, however,
would have promoted the public policy of encouraging taxpayers to
use personal funds to further charitable service. The Davis court could
have applied the charity control test to avoid taxpayer abuse and
assure the use of the transfers for bona fide charitable service.
David L. Herron
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